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The Campaign Against ‘Amerika’: 
Catalyst for Media Democratization 
 
Robert A. Hackett 
 
This essay recalls an ad hoc protest campaign against Amerika, a 
television mini-series broadcast by the ABC and CTV networks 
during the fading years of the Cold War (1987). Depicting a fic-
tional Soviet takeover of the US, the program aroused a storm of 
controversy in both the US and Canada, where it raised addi-
tional issues such as cultural sovereignty. The partners, activities 
and accomplishments of the protest campaign are described; it 
changed the program’s discursive context and forced the broad-
casters to respond. More enduringly, the campaign prefigured a 
later wave of democratic media activism by questioning media 
content, challenging the asymmetrical media-audience relation-
ship, implying a new model of public communication, highlight-
ing the contradictions between media imperatives and social 
movements, and providing a springboard for specifically media-
oriented activism. 
 
T his essay exhumes, from the ephemerality of television culture, events from 1986/87—years when nightmares of nuclear annihilation still haunted the public mind. The Cold War had not yet petered out, and Mikhail Gorbachev's new leadership had not yet erased American per-
ceptions of the Soviet Union as the "Evil Empire," as it was called by the hardline 
anti-Communist president of the day, Ronald Reagan. 
In many respects, today’s politics and mediascape comprise a different world. 
And yet, the case discussed here has implications for contemporary projects to de-
mocratize communication. It concerns a protest campaign launched by social 
movements, one in which the media figured not just as conduits for mobilization 
and message dissemination. Rather, the campaign's defining target was itself a me-
dia event—a television network mini-series called Amerika.  
For fourteen-and-a-half prime-time hours during the week of February 15, 
1987, ABC—and the Canadian network CTV—broadcasted a saga about life in the 
USA ten years after a bloodless takeover by the Soviet Union. Some sense of the 
film's flavor is conveyed by the characters listed in a Viewers' Guide which ABC, 
in an unusual step, had specially prepared. Devin Milford (played by Kris Kristof-
ferson) was a former presidential candidate, an antiwar Vietnam veteran, and the 
son of a once prominent farming family in Milford, Nebraska—a family reduced, 
like most of the population, to poverty and despair under the new regime. By the 
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series's end, a martyred Devin had become a symbol of hope for the renewal of 
American patriotism. Peter Bradford represents another option: he is a pragmatist 
working within the new regime to make the best of a bad situation. His wife 
Amanda becomes increasingly disenchanted with the compromises he makes with 
the authorities. Devin's sister Alathea Milford is uncomfortable with the propa-
ganda she is now forced to teach in the local school, but is involved in a self-
destructive relationship with Helmut Gurtman, the brutal East German local com-
mander of the Soviet-controlled United Nations peacekeeping forces. Soviet admin-
istrator Colonel Andrei Denisov manipulates Peter Bradford to dismantle the struc-
tures and symbols of American unity, yet is himself strongly attracted to the origi-
nal ideals of Americanism. He consorts with Kimberly Ballard, an actress who 
moves towards the underground resistance after some of her friends in an "outlaw 
theatre" group are arrested. Meanwhile, with the help of her Soviet lover General 
Petra Samonov, Devin's ambitious and cunning ex-wife Marion Andrews Milford 
climbs the new regime's political ladder, quite prepared to kill Devin if need be. 
Amerika was remarkable, but not because it was original. The manichean theme 
of struggle between the forces of light (Democracy) and darkness (Communism), 
the ideologically loaded "epic" narrated through familial and sexual relationships, 
and even the specific premise of national degradation and Soviet occupation, had 
ample precedents since the emergence of mass television and the Cold War at the 
same historical moment. It was somewhat unusual that a network television pro-
gram would wear its politics so openly on its sleeves, and that in the 1980s, before 
the era of large-scale international co-productions, a major network would stake so 
much of its prestige, prime-time and money (reported variously as $30 to $44 mil-
lion) on a film premised so explicitly on "a right-wing paranoid's dream (Gitlin 
1986).  
What was most remarkable about the series, though, was the campaign of pro-
test which it provoked in the months before it aired, a campaign involving a variety 
of disarmament and other citizens' groups. While the campaign faded to black al-
most as soon as the program itself, it is deserving of rescue from the historical am-
nesia of North American culture. Accordingly, this article first sketches that cam-
paign and the ensuing controversy, particularly the tactics and arguments of the 
protest groups, and the campaign's achievements. I then argue that the campaign 
constituted, implicitly or explicitly, a challenge to the logic of commercial broad-
casting. As such, it has lessons about the potential for a project like Free Press and 
other campaigns to democratize media and communications policy in the 2000s. 
 
 
The Emergence of a Controversy 
 
The story of Amerika really begins on November 20, 1983, when over 80 million 
Americans were subjected to an imaginary nuclear war. That Sunday evening, ABC 
broadcast The Day After, a three-hour prime-time drama about the horror of a nu-
clear attack on a small town in Kansas. It was "one of the most widely watched and 
debated dramatic programs in television history" (Adams et al., 1986, 192). Nuclear 
freeze activists welcomed the program as "a 7 million dollar advertising job for our 
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issue", and prepared for a stampede of new recruits. Conservatives denounced the 
film as an attack on America's nuclear policies and a boost for Soviet propaganda. 
Seeking no doubt to deflect political criticism from the Reagan administration and 
its allies, ABC devoted a special issue of Nightline immediately following the film 
to a discussion of deterrence theory involving "mostly former government offi-
cials" (Adams et al. 1986).  
In many ways, the program did not live up to its advance publicity and expecta-
tions. Its political impact was undermined by its avoidance of explicit political 
analysis, its failure to offer Americans any new information to challenge their pre-
existing attitudes (already strongly favorable to a bilateral nuclear freeze), and its 
muted depiction of nuclear aftermath. One study even suggested that The Day After 
generated slightly increased optimism about the chances of post-nuclear survival 
(Adams et al. 1986). 
Nevertheless, conservatives continued to call on ABC to "tell the other side of 
the story"—not, as some disarmament activists suggested, about life in a disarmed 
world, but about the consequences of abandoning America’s “nuclear deterrent”. 
Shortly before The Day After aired, Ben Stein, a former speech-writer for Richard 
Nixon, suggested in his Los Angeles newspaper column that ABC make a movie 
about life in America under a Soviet occupation (Stein 1983), an idea later advo-
cated by Reed Irvine, head of the right-wing media watchdog group Accuracy in 
Media. This proposal found its way to ABC entertainment executive Brandon 
Stoddard, who asked Donald Wrye to develop a script and then to produce and di-
rect the film (Gitlin 1986, 18). 
ABC never publicly admitted that Amerika was a response to right-wing pres-
sure, or an attempt to "balance" The Day After. Although ABC paid Stein a fee for 
the story idea, Stoddard consistently described it as non-political entertainment. 
However, the commercial pressures on network television make it vulnerable to 
political conformity with both elite interests and with perceived popular consensus 
(Hallin 1986b). As Gitlin (1985, vii) noted, The Day After, "muffled as it turned out 
to be, was dreamed up before Ronald Reagan came to office. In the ensuing politi-
cal climate, the space for political diversity at the networks has shrunk." When 
Amerika was conceived in 1983/84, Reagan and his conservative supporters were in 
the political ascendancy, and superpower relations were at their worst in twenty 
years (the Soviets had shot down a Korean airliner in September 1983, Reagan had 
announced his controversial "Star Wars" missile defense program, and the deploy-
ment of new missiles was sparking massive demonstrations in Western Europe). 
By autumn 1985, the first newspaper reports about the project began to ring 
political alarm bells. Despite ABC's secrecy about the plot, versions of the script 
were leaked to the emerging media monitoring group Fairness and Accuracy in 
Reporting (FAIR), whose access to such inside information thus made it an instant 
media source, according to FAIR founder Jeff Cohen in an interview with this 
writer. And the plot had something to outrage almost everybody to the left of Darth 
Vader—an America weakened from within by apathy, feminism and peaceniks, and 
populated with opportunistic collaborators and an ineffective Resistance, acquiesc-
ing in its transformation into the Soviet-controlled puppet state of Amerika—until 
the spirit of patriotism is rekindled by Kristofferson's protagonist. 
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Small wonder that this scenario pushed political buttons. The Soviets them-
selves were amongst the first to protest, threatening to withhold co-operation from 
ABC News' Moscow bureau for three years if the network proceeded with the pro-
ject. But the Soviets' blustering backfired. In the process of being taken over by the 
budget-conscious Capital Cities Communications – a precursor of media mergers to 
come – ABC had been considering axing the project for financial reasons. But the 
Soviet threats (slyly amplified by Amerika's supporters within ABC) backed the 
network publicly into a corner. With its reputation on the home front at stake, ABC 
pushed ahead with the project. 
Filming began in spring 1986, in Tecumseh, a depressed rural Nebraskan town 
which doubled as Milford in Amerika's Heartland. Smitten by the glamour of Hol-
lywood, the local press greeted the film with civic boosterism, and the populace 
lined up for jobs as extras. The relatively few Nebraskan peace activists who pro-
tested the film's militaristic implications were generally ignored or dismissed as 
spoilsports. 
Nevertheless, an unusual groundswell of protest did develop within the US and 
Canada, a groundswell without a centre in any single organization, and one which 
(at least temporarily and ambivalently) included members of the political and me-
dia elites, as well as dozens of grassroots citizens' groups. The campaign coalition 
included religious groups, feminists, academics, professionals, peace education 
centres, disarmament and nuclear freeze groups, community and access media ac-
tivists, media critics, friends of the United Nations, anti-interventionists, groups 
concerned with globalism, US-Soviet relations, peace, social justice and Third 
World solidarity. 
The protests focused on several themes. Most frequently, the film was decried 
for fostering an unduly paranoid view of the USSR, a criticism shared even by 
some Establishment figures, like ex-CIA chief William Colby. Other elite critics 
focused on the film's negative depiction of United Nations’ peacekeepers as a brutal 
tool of Soviet domination. Prodded by concerned Americans and Canadians, UN 
officials and supporters joined the emerging controversy.  
Critics further to the left were angered by the film's portrayal of socialist and 
even liberal interpretations of American society as Soviet propaganda, by its per-
ceived stereotyping of women that provided grounds for a feminist critique of the 
film, and by its promotion of militarism. FAIR’s founder Jeff Cohen called the  
mini-series a commercial for Reagan's Star Wars program (Waters 1986).  
One suspects, however, that much of the opposition was animated less by the 
film's (mis)representation of specific groups and viewpoints than by the “structure 
of feeling” (Williams 1977) that it both expressed and evoked. Amerika was, in the 
very words of an ABC commercial, a "call to arms”. It sought to "revitalize" 
American patriotism, without clearly distinguishing it from superpower chauvin-
ism, and to equate it with an ideologically narrow set of values, such as "freedom" 
defined as rugged individualism. It created a mood of siege from without and be-
trayal from within, and provided a myth of national degradation and potential re-
demption through a charismatic (male) leader who personifies national ideals. It 
offered the pleasure of a narrative in which American audiences could, yet again, 
revel in seeing themselves as victims, underdogs and rebels—an inversion of their 
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system's real role in the world which had been evident in popular literature even 
following the US atomic bombing of Japan (Boyer 1985, 14). 
In short, Amerika was a litmus test of political sensibilities. It was most likely to 
offend Americans whose social experience or historical memory—most notably 
from the counterculture of the Vietnam war era—gave them reason to fear the in-
tensification of American nationalism into an unreflective chauvinism. It was a 
lightning rod for Americans who felt the dominant media had been complicit in the 
political consequences of Reaganism—renewed Cold War tensions, the contain-
ment of domestic dissent, growing economic inequality, and a militaristic and inter-
ventionist foreign policy. Similar sentiments regarding the US corporate media’s 
complicity in massaging public opinion prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, cata-
lyzed outrage and resurgent media activism two decades later (McChesney 2004, 
279-80).  
By the time Amerika aired in February 1987, the protest campaign encompassed 
a wide range of grassroots activities. FAIR set up its first formal office in New 
York City and took a leading role in developing critical media reaction to the mini-
series very early on. The Philadelphia-based American Friends Service Committee, 
the Quakers, provided activists and the media with informational packets. Educa-
tors for Social Responsibility, with 10,000 members in the US, prepared teaching 
materials for elementary and secondary schools. Psychologists for Social Responsi-
bility held a New York conference on "the psychology of enemy images”. In the 
spirit of town-meeting democracy, local groups organized teach-ins and other pub-
lic events, and approached local media outlets, especially ABC affiliates, for pro-
gramming to provide alternative views. The California satirical troupe, the Pluto-
nium Players, inspired "Amerikon" parties where radical "couch potatoes" gathered 
to conduct semiotic guerrilla warfare, challenging the frustration and isolation of 
viewing the program alone, and sometime generating local media coverage. 
A great deal of the anti-Amerika campaign focussed on pressuring ABC and its 
local affiliates to provide counterbalancing programming. Indeed, one of the first 
organizations actively to mobilize on the issue was named Equal Time. It was not a 
well-heeled think tank, but consisted of two neighbors, Jane Schirmer and Barb 
Tiedje, working out of Schirmer's kitchen in Madison, Wisconsin, with her three 
small children as officemates. Using out-of-pocket money, the two women con-
tacted hundreds of groups listed in a local church's Peace and Justice Directory, 
alerting them to propagandistic elements of the script. Schirmer and Tiedje also 
circulated petitions and collected thousands of signatures calling on ABC to grant 
equal time to opposing viewpoints. And they identified and contacted potential 
sponsors of Amerika, including the Chrysler Corporation which was preparing to 
buy millions of dollars' worth of airtime. 
 
 
Amerika in Canada 
 
The campaign against Amerika extended to Canada as well, partly because Can-
ada's largest commercial television network, CTV, decided to broadcast Amerika—
the only non-American broadcaster to do so, even though most Canadian house-
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holds could receive ABC directly through their cable service. Longstanding Cana-
dian concerns about cultural sovereignty, combined with growing skepticism re-
garding the US role in the arms race, meant that Canadian audiences were not par-
ticularly likely to accept the film on its own terms. 
Moreover, much of the film was actually made in Canada. Lured by the profes-
sionalism of local film crews, the (then) cheap Canadian dollar, and other economic 
considerations critical to the film’s completion, the producers shot a number of 
scenes in Toronto during summer 1986, with tax-funded logistical help from civic 
authorities (including the police and fire departments) and the Ontario Film Devel-
opment Corporation (OFDC), whose mandate includes facilitating film production 
in the province. Officials co-operated with the producers by keeping film locations 
secret and refusing to discuss the script.  
As in the US, Canadian opposition emerged in an ad hoc way, first surfacing at 
a Toronto public meeting in July 1986. Sponsored by Performing Artists for Nu-
clear Disarmament (PAND), the panelists included an outspoken media critic of the 
film, and director Donald Wrye, who reportedly participated only on condition that 
the press be barred due to its "self-serving" coverage.  
The outcome was the formation of Propaganda Alert (PA). Launched by Laura 
Sky, Toronto film-maker and founder of Media People for Social Responsibility, 
and Canadian Broadcasting Corporation radio producer Max Allen, PA was an ad 
hoc alliance of actors, writers, peace activists and media people. Born of outrage, 
and without precedents for fighting network television, PA’s precise objectives and 
strategy were not obvious givens. In the end, PA took a position both against state 
censorship, and against state subsidization of "hateful and destructive propaganda."  
Rather than try to sabotage the production, the group chose to stimulate public 
awareness and debate over the ethical implications of the film's messages, as well 
as the manner of its making–the film-makers' disruption of neighborhoods, schools 
and hospitals without adequately informing residents about the nature of the pro-
ject; the collusion of public authorities with the film-makers, without sufficient 
prior public debate; and the self-censorship of Canadian cultural workers resulting 
from their economic dependence on foreign projects and fear of blacklisting–in 
ironic contrast to the film’s intended message of (American) freedom and civic 
engagement (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 1987, 20). In part, PA chose 
these issues to make Amerika a local concern, to drive home the point that Cold 
War paranoia was being produced in Torontonians' backyard, and that they had 
some stake and responsibility in it. 
PA’s small core of activists generated a whirlwind of activity, from virtual 
street theatre to political lobbying. They contacted peace and social justice groups 
in the US, working particularly closely with FAIR, Equal Time, the Committee for 
National Security, and church groups, to form a network to exchange information 
and to plan action. (Ironically, such American connections probably provided the 
cachet to make Amerika a major media issue in Canada.)  Acting on tips from infor-
mants, they charged around Toronto to photograph the filming on location and to 
hand out leaflets to spectators. They obtained a leaked copy of the script, and after 
marathon photocopying sessions in those pre-Internet days, made it available at 
several locations for public perusal. In the venerable tradition of conscientious dis-
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sent, they sought to document, to witness and to testify about an activity they re-
garded as a public wrong. 
In addition, they lobbied relevant civic and provincial politicians and officials. 
They asked for details and questioned the appropriateness of government support 
for such productions, touted the possibility of criminal charges for disseminating 
hate propaganda, and wrote to institutions (including a Catholic school and the Uni-
versity of Toronto) that lent logistical support to the production. The protest cam-
paign sprang up in other Canadian cities, including Vancouver, where this writer 
acted informally as a faculty advisor to the Simon Fraser University Media Group, 
a student club that prepared an educational package for high schools, contacted 
local disarmament groups, arranged public panels, and wrote to CTV and the local 
press. 
After all the "colossal dirigible of hype" (Bacchus 1987), the actual airing of 
Amerika in February 1987 was anti-climatic. Even at forty million viewers per 
night, the ratings fell short of ABC's hopes and the 1983 audience for The Day Af-
ter. The program itself proved to be not quite the Cold War cartoon that many pro-
testers had anticipated. To be sure, some scenes were as inflammatory as any ever 
seen in television entertainment: tanks rolling over defenceless refugees, the ma-
chine-gunning of Congress members. Yet the dialogue, however cliche-ridden, was 
several shades of sophistication beyond Rambo, and the two key Soviet characters 
were portrayed more sympathetically than many of their American counterparts. 
Adopting some of the conventions of realist epics (Testa 1987, 27-28), Amerika's 
pacing was often far slower than the standard Hollywood action film; some observ-
ers found it hypnotic, others simply boring. The movie's political messages were 
somewhat ambiguous, bearing the imprint of producer Wrye's efforts to bend the 
right-wing paranoid premise of a Soviet invasion to other purposes—notably a ser-
monette on the need for a revival of an altruistic, communitarian and almost spiri-
tual brand of American patriotism. Conservatives complained that the horrors of 
Soviet occupation were underplayed. While such complaints arguably demonstrate 
the insatiability of the neo-conservative agenda, they also suggest that Amerika was 
not simply a Cold War Reaganite entertainment. Speculatively, the film might be 
seen as an expression of national angst in response to the dawn of the post-Cold 
War era. If the self-identity of American nationhood had long rested heavily on a 
Manichean contrast with the archetypical Soviet enemy, then the latter's disappear-
ance might cause America a loss of collective purpose, even a more basic kind of 
disintegration (Galtung 1987; Wright 1989). Perhaps Amerika can be read as a la-
ment for that condition and a call for inner renewal—one that unfortunately, ap-
pears to have been pre-empted by the 21st century “war on terror”. 
Its unexpectedly ambiguous and confused politics, and its relatively low ratings, 
probably contributed to the rapidly fading newsworthiness of Amerika within days 
of its funereal procession through prime-time. That is not to say that the protest 
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The Protest Campaign’s Achievements 
 
The protest campaign changed the communicative context of the program. It turned 
it from another piece of network entertainment which one could consume, into a 
controversy which one had to discuss and choose sides. The campaign successfully 
defined the program as the site of conflict. Normally, in a conflict of narrow scope, 
"the weaker party has much to gain and little to lose by broadening the scope, draw-
ing third parties into the conflict as mediators or partisans" (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 
1993, 116). The campaign successfully broadened the conflict and evoked or forced 
responses from players not initially involved. 
The media/movement dynamic was a familiar one: the media helped to amplify 
the protest campaign, but its sometimes negative framing also helped to contain it 
(Gitlin 1980). In the Toronto press, a survey by local activists suggested, Amerika 
received more coverage in 1986 than any other single peace issue. In the editorial 
pages, debate raged. Many letters vilified the film, but others opposed the protest-
ers, usually developing one of two arguments: first, it was entirely appropriate to 
emphasize the menace of Communism; second, the protests jeopardized the eco-
nomic benefits of US film production in Canada. In Vancouver, press attention was 
most piqued by the SFU students' open letter calling, not for censorship, but for a 
voluntary boycott of CTV's advertisers if the network did not provide counterbal-
ancing programming – an inflection of commercial television’s own ideological 
rationale of consumer choice. The letter provoked an editorial in Vancouver’s lar-
ger daily (Vancouver Sun, Feb. 10, 1987) accusing the group of “economic terror-
ism”. (As risible as this response was in light of press silence about the censoring 
impact of commercialization and corporate concentration, advertiser boycotts are a 
controversial tactic amongst progressive media activists; FAIR avoids them on the 
grounds that they validate advertiser power over media content.) 
Still, media frames were not entirely negative; they situated the campaign in the 
sphere of legitimate controversy rather than deviance (Hallin 1986a). Moreover, the 
campaign did attract attention to its issues, and stimulated a good deal of critical 
commentary on the film itself. The pre-Internet media system was not entirely 
monolithic, and the campaign was able to exploit such openings as the apparent 
disdain of some print media journalists for the dominant medium, television. The 
controversy received prominent coverage not only in newsmagazines like News-
week and Maclean's, but also in weekly television listings and periodicals such as 
Vogue, TV Guide and People, which usually steer clear of "politics" (as they nar-
rowly define it) in favor of personalities, stars and glitz. Some of these magazines 
ran scathing previews of Amerika. For instance, People's critic denounced the film 
for irresponsibly exploiting fear and world tension, describing the spectacle of UN 
troops demolishing the refugee camp as "the most manipulative, hysterical and vio-
lent scene I've ever seen on TV, one clearly designed to make you scream: 'Nuke 
Moscow!'” (Jarvis 1987, 9). The campaign was even able to dent the informal truce 
which normally inhibits television networks from criticizing each other. NBC's late 
night talk shows satirized the mini-series; news anchorman John Chancellor de-
nounced it. 
In addition to coverage of the controversy itself, some broadcasters provided 
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counter-programming as a political alternative to Amerika—a gambit perhaps with-
out precedent in television history (Cohen 1987, A11). Discovery Channel aired 
about sixty hours of Soviet television; Rogers Cablevision in Canada followed suit. 
Phil Donahue's talk show broadcast for a week from the USSR. Ted Turner's At-
lanta superstation aired twelve hours of programming on disarmament, Soviet-
American co-operation, and a documentary on how American media have stirred 
up Cold War tensions. Turner himself spoke out strongly for improved superpower 
relations and against ABC's "irresponsibility". Arguably, such counterbalancing 
would be less likely today, given the higher degree of concentrated ownership in 
corporate media, their greater symbiosis with government, the conscious right-wing 
mobilization and “Fox effect” in corporate broadcasting, and the climate of ideo-
logical conformity during the “war on terror” (Knightley 2002; McChesney 2004)   
By enlarging the scope of the conflict, the campaign not only created new alli-
ances and networks; it also motivated individuals and groups who were not other-
wise involved but who shared some of its concerns to take supportive action. For 
instance, Propaganda Alert's photos of extras dressed as UN troops on the streets of 
Toronto may have been instrumental in arousing UN officials to speak out against 
the film. After PA intervened, the University of Toronto withdrew permission for 
further filming on its campus, and avoided identification in the film credits. The 
rector of an Anglican Church wrote a lengthy column in Canada’s largest daily, the 
Toronto Star apologizing for renting church accommodation for extras without 
considering the implications of the movie. Unbeknownst to the protesters at the 
time, they were also encouraging soul-searching amongst some of the members of 
Amerika's own cast (Taylor 1986; Calixto 1987, 30). 
Of course, not all the stakeholders reversed their stance. Ontario officials and 
politicians, Toronto’s city council, the administrators of a Toronto Catholic school 
where some scenes were shot, all sought to sidestep the issue, disavowing responsi-
bility for the film’s content. Nevertheless, they were feeling the heat. An OFDC 
official paid Laura Sky the backhand compliment of describing Amerika as the 
most difficult production he had ever worked on, given the unprecedented furor. 
Even some of the most powerful players in the media system, advertisers, were 
moved to respond to the campaign out of self-interest. Two months before airtime, 
press reports identified Chrysler Motors as a potential major sponsor, one intending 
to purchase about 38 of Amerika’s 204 commercials for an estimated seven million 
dollars. It seemed like a "perfect prime-time marriage" between "an automaker that 
wraps itself in the flag and a mini-series that will deliver 12 hours of…tub-
thumping, old-fashioned patriotism” (Gunther 1986). A Chrysler spokesman 
praised the projected large and upscale audience for the program. By contrast with 
advertisers’ avoidance of The Day After due to right-wing attacks, a left-oriented 
protest campaign did not seem to pose a problem.  
Undaunted, Equal Time (the two neighbors in Madison) organized a petition, 
forwarding thousands of copies to Chrysler chairman Lee Iacocca (and easily sur-
passing the mark set by The Day After's detractors). The petition deliberately 
avoided calling for the program's cancellation, a consumer boycott, or a withdrawal 
of sponsorship. Instead, it took the high road of "informing" the corporation of pub-
lic outrage. (Other protesters were less restrained; one Chrysler stockholder and 
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former UN official proposed a divestment movement or buyers' boycott.)  Iacocca 
sent Equal Time a personal letter of thanks for informing him of the opposition—
then, dramatically, he withdrew Chrysler’s sponsorship about two weeks before 
Amerika's debut, publicly citing the incompatibility of its "upbeat" commercials 
with the film's "intense and emotional" subject matter and portrayal (Boyer 1987). 
However, many observers, including ABC executives, felt that the protest cam-
paign had achieved a stunning victory. In local markets, a number of other advertis-
ers followed Chrysler's lead. 
The networks with so much invested in the project could not afford to ignore 
the issue. As the maker and US broadcaster of Amerika, ABC had most at stake. Its 
interests, however, were not monolithic. As an advertising-dependent media enter-
prise, it clearly had a stake in maintaining profits through attracting large audiences 
to commercially viable programming. But it also may be worthwhile to produce 
expensive and even controversial programming which might not reap short-term 
profits, but which might enhance the prestige of the network (and make money 
through overseas sales or a second run in the schedule). Each national TV network 
also has a stake in maintaining its own political acceptability -- in particular, in 
relation to the dominant forces in the White House and Congress which are key 
news sources, and which have so much potential power over its legal and economic 
environment. Yet at the same time, as a result of their head-to-head competition for 
a mass national audience, the commercial networks are strongly imbued with a 
sense of populism, one which impels them "to avoid controversies that seem likely 
to offend the mass audience, or to jump on the bandwagon of what seems a safe 
and appealing majority sentiment" (Hallin 1986b, 15). Moreover, commercial me-
dia organizations need to maintain the appearance of integrity, objectivity, and 
autonomy, for the sake of public credibility—which in turn reinforces their eco-
nomic, symbolic, and political capital. 
ABC's responses to the unanticipated controversy illustrated this corporate bal-
ancing act. Essentially, its response boiled down to four tactics.  
First, ABC attempted to legitimize the program as non-political entertainment—
or even as thought-provoking drama, above and beyond run-of-the-mill prime-time 
fare. Yet ABC did not present that line consistently. Writer/director Donald Wrye 
described Amerika as “really just an entertainment” at a Toronto forum, yet else-
where, he labeled it "a moral lesson in the way democracy can fail" and the value of 
American patriotism (Santarossa 1986; Mieses 1987; Gottlieb 1987, 42-43). De-
parting further from the “just entertainment” line, ABC Community Relations divi-
sion produced a Viewer's Guide to "Amerika" that was skewed heavily towards the 
symbols and agenda of the political Right. 
Second, perhaps caught in their own contradictions, ABC and CTV riposted to 
the protesters, raising the spectre of “censorship,” or (more cleverly) suggesting 
that the controversy would inhibit creative programming in the future – a question-
begging exercise that assumed that Amerika was, in Wrye’s words, “thinking per-
son’s television” (Blair 1987, 6). 
In addition to self-justification and counter-attacks, the networks made minor 
concessions to the protesters. ABC and some of its local affiliates provided a lim-
ited amount of airtime for discussion of Amerika. Most notable perhaps was a spe-
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cial edition of ABC News Viewpoint hosted by Ted Koppel. Its battery of panelists 
included several media executives, and elite critics of the program—but none of the 
grassroots groups that had made Amerika an issue in the first place. Jeff Cohen, 
however, was able to speak from the floor, and increase FAIR’s national visibility. 
A less obvious minor concession consisted of certain script revisions prior to 
the film's final editing, and an on-air disclaimer concerning the fictional nature of 
the organizations depicted. On the other hand, the opposition did not win counter-
balancing entertainment programming, such as already-available anti-nuclearist 
documentaries. Nor did ABC provide extended discussion shows comparable to 
those that had followed The Day After. 
The unexpected nature of the protests contributed to the ad hoc nature of ABC's 
response: they fell outside the network's increasingly institutionalized mechanisms 
for converting potentially disruptive pressure from established interest groups into 
manageable and even useful feedback (Montgomery 1989). Consequently, as air-
time approached and the protests continued, the network adopted a fourth tactic: 
incorporating the controversy into the program's pre-publicity, and using it to build 
the potential audience. 
Reaction from members of the potential audience for Amerika to the protest 
campaign was mixed. Spectators at Toronto and Nebraska filming locations were 
indifferent or hostile to the protests and the ethical issues, but we have already 
noted a wave of support from elsewhere. Moreover, beyond its more tangible 
achievements, the protests changed the film's whole communicative context, and 
therefore its probable political impact. One study found that the protest campaign 
may well have established widely-held perceptions that Amerika was an anti-
Communist Cold War morality tale, encouraging those who shared its perceived 
politics to watch it, and filtering out from the potential audience those who did not 
(Kim, Gustainis and Shoar-Ghaffar 1988). Unfortunately, the researchers did not 
measure respondents' perceptions of the film itself, but it is reasonable to conclude 
that viewers of all political stripes were made aware that it was controversial, open 
to question.  
Moreover, the protests clearly encouraged people skeptical of the film's politics 
to channel private frustration and anger into public energy. The controversy pro-
vided a virtually unprecedented opportunity for progressive-minded critics to gain 
access to the mainstream media's huge audiences, in order to discuss (in however 
refracted a way) the politics, power and responsibilities of those media themselves 
in the nuclear age. At least briefly, such questions were prominent in the media's 
agenda. Moreover, the protests initiated by citizens' groups created a synergy, a 
movement with ripple effects in unlikely places—including the cast of the film 
itself.  
The campaign forged new links between a number of individuals and groups 
concerned with different aspects of the Amerika phenomenon. FAIR's Jeff Cohen 
(1987, A11) expressed hope that "the program may prove to be a turning point in 
the history of media treatment of the Cold War". The campaign served notice to 
established media that reactionary lobbyists like AIM were no longer the only ac-
tors capable of delivering “flak”.  
Most crucially, the protest campaign suggested the potential for a new kind of 
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political alignment, between critical social movements concerned with peace and 
social justice, and a project of challenging media structure and content. 
 
 
The Amerika Campaign as Incipient Media Democratization? 
 
Of course, the campaign should not be romanticized or mythologized. The number 
of protesters was very small when weighed against the millions of viewers of the 
program, many of whom undoubtedly supported or at least failed to critically assess 
the film's premises. Few of the protesters aimed explicitly for a sweeping democra-
tization of media structure or content; rather, the campaign's derived its momentum 
by piggy-backing on the existing resources (especially mailing lists and other com-
munications networks) of peace groups who saw Amerika as a threat to their pri-
mary political agenda. The various groups involved were not entirely unified in 
purpose and methods—how broadly the campaign should be focussed, whether or 
not to call for a boycott or even censorship, whether to work to change the media 
content available to viewers (and if so, in what ways), or whether to encourage 
would-be viewers to drop out of the audience altogether. Although the campaign 
succeeded brilliantly in provoking a brief national debate on media values and eth-
ics, it had no notable long-term impact on TV programming. Even some critics 
sympathetic to the protest's goals dismissed it as a flash-in-the-pan, an aberration, 
and/or a misguided over-reaction to, and over-estimation of, Amerika's potential 
political impact and its deviance from regular media programming (e.g. Bacchus 
1987). 
Yet Amerika was, if not an anomaly, then a particularly extreme example of 
some of the worst biases of mainstream American television -- the networks' vul-
nerability to conservative political pressure, their uncritical ratification of US na-
tionalism, their repeated demonizing of enemies and their portrayal of the US as 
innocent victim of hostile foreigners. Because it sharply problematized ABC's 
sense of balance and responsibility at a sensitive time in US/Soviet relations, 
Amerika was a deserving focal point of protest. 
Nevertheless, the critics who saw the program as more typical than aberrant 
have a point. Indeed, it is partly because Amerika shared so much with the pro-
gramming that continues to dominate the media today that the protest against it has 
enduring significance. To be sure, there has arguably been no similar large-scale 
protest campaign against a single television product since Amerika. That is partly 
because with the relative decline of the then-hegemonic networks (ABC, NBC, 
CBS), the proliferation of channels, the internationalization of television co-
productions, as well as the Internet’s challenge to the dominance of television itself, 
no single program could dominate today’s mediascape in the same way. But that 
does not mean that the protest campaign was an aberration. Rather, it was both a 
precursor and a springboard, for waves of media activism that came to the fore in 
the 1990s and since.  
At least implicitly, the campaign challenged the governing logics of the major 
media, including their dominance over audience leisure time and over the            
(re)production and circulation of public meanings, in at least five ways. Most obvi-
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ously, the protesters brought into question the content of media. They offered a 
progressive critique that challenged hegemonic assumptions embedded in the me-
dia's apparently neutral entertainment. Moreover, they clearly posited the need for 
programming to meet the cultural and political interests of a constituency which 
could not readily be defined in terms of advertisers' demographics—namely, the 
broad and socially diverse coalition of people seeking international peace through 
disarmament. Their conception of media responsibility was radically at odds with 
the networks' purpose of telling "entertaining" stories to attract profitable audiences 
and advertisers. 
In Canada, there was an additional and paradoxical dimension to the campaign's 
demand that broadcasters serve cultural purposes beyond those of commercial 
logic. On the one hand, it may well have taken American media and American 
peace groups to put the issue on Canada’s public agenda. On the other hand, the 
whole saga pointed to the need for autonomy from excessive American influence 
on Canadian cultural production and expression. Even with the advent of Canada-
US “free trade” in the 1980s, Canadian governmental policy continued to proclaim 
that government intervention in the broadcasting and film industries was needed to 
support Canada’s "cultural sovereignty"; but the reality, as the roles of the OFDC 
and CTV in the Amerika affair suggest, was often at odds with this formal commit-
ment. However, if media democratization implies that audiences have an opportu-
nity to participate in expressing and producing socially effective meanings, the 
wholesale colonization of leisure time by programming imported from a foreign 
country is hardly compatible with a democratic media system. Nor is it compatible 
with self-determination for Canada's cultural workers, as their apparent fear of 
blacklisting by Hollywood producers’ shows. 
A second counter-hegemonic dimension of the campaign was its disruption of 
the one-way flow of messages from dominant media to their relatively passive au-
diences. The campaign challenged this asymmetrical relationship in several ways. It 
developed a communications network of it own, bypassing the major media in fa-
vor of pre-Internet grassroots tools like the newsletter, camera, tape recorder, pho-
tocopier and telephone. Even though proposals that people simply refuse to watch 
the program were not prominent in the campaign, it did seem to succeed (as noted 
above) in "filtering out" some of the potential audience. As an early example of 
culture jamming, the tactic of satirical "couch potato" parties took a different tack: 
watch the program, but in the process, change the relationship between medium, 
message and viewer. 
Certainly ABC's and CTV's own response to the controversy indicated aware-
ness that their own domination over media content and audiences was being chal-
lenged. Their admonitions to protesters to first watch the program, the attempt to 
capitalize on the controversy to build the audience, and the rhetorical accusation of 
"censorship" were defensive responses to that challenge. Moreover, the campaign 
clearly helped many potential viewers overcome their sense of frustration, outrage, 
isolation and powerlessness. A small core of activists was able to place the question 
of media responsibility in the nuclear age on the public agenda partly because they 
tapped deep currents in popular culture, including fear of nuclear war and frustra-
tion with one-sided media power. 
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Third, the campaign implied a rejection of established legitimations of the me-
dia, and the need for a new model or public philosophy of communication. That 
ideological challenge may not be evident at first sight. After all, in so far as it called 
for "balance" in television programming, the campaign was using the system's own 
language. As part of the media's "regime of objectivity," the concept of balance is 
readily understood and accepted by audiences; connoting equality and reasonable-
ness, it is a tool both useful and principled, in contesting the media’s concentration 
of society’s “symbolic power” (Couldry 2003, 39). At the same time, on its own, 
"balance" is a limited kind of demand. It is reactive rather than proactive, its imple-
mentation rather dependent on the goodwill and self-interest of broadcasters them-
selves. Moreover, even when broadcasters do present "both sides" of an issue, such 
balance typically favors conventional views over those that are less familiar to au-
diences, reduces complex issues to a simplistic for/against format, and allows elite 
voices and media professionals to define the limits of debate (Hackett and Zhao 
1998).  
Nevertheless, in resorting to political pressure, in using publicity to define 
Amerika as problematic, and in expanding the scope of the controversy to attract 
allies, the campaign implicitly rejected a key ideological legitimation of commer-
cial broadcasting – consumer sovereignty. The campaign was premised on rejecting 
the idea that media consumers’ isolated, individual decision to watch a particular 
program or not, was a sufficient mechanism of media accountability. Although pro-
testers were prepared to turn the ideology of consumer sovereignty against the net-
works, the campaign also made claims upon television as a public resource, one 
deserving of public scrutiny and debate. In that vein, a Los Angeles writer whose 
articles helped spark the original protests, ultimately concluded that the campaign 
was too narrowly focussed, since what was at stake was the power of monopolistic 
private networks over media workers, audiences, and the public airwaves:  “The 
disease, then, is not Amerika, but rather the very structure of our mass electronic 
media” (Cooper 1987).  
By demanding counter-balancing programming and a right of reply on air, the 
protesters also challenged the interpretation of “freedom of the press” as a property 
right of media owners. Indeed, implicitly they were challenging the adequacy of 
“freedom of expression” as a foundation for democratic communication, prefigur-
ing instead the “right to communicate” as a universal human right. Having been 
buried in the wake of the politically ill-fated New World Information and Commu-
nication Order debate in the UN in the early 1980s, the concept of communication 
rights has re-emerged in recent years. Civil society organizations intervening in 
international media governance forums, such as the World Summit on the Informa-
tion Society, are framing their proposals in terms that both include and transcend 
individual freedom of opinion and expression. Communication rights also entail the 
ability of individuals and groups to be heard and understood, to learn and respond, 
and to share in the production and benefits of social knowledge, and the determina-
tion of political outcomes (White 1995; CRIS Campaign 2005). In demanding ac-
cess to the public forum, and inclusion in public discourse, the Amerika campaign 
represented an important step towards this more expansive concept of democratic 
communication. 
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Fourth, the Amerika campaign highlighted the contradictions between the logic 
of dominant media, and the political and communication needs of progressive so-
cial movements. Given such influences as ownership, commercial logic, techno-
logical biases, occupational routines and other factors, media discourse will often 
be at odds with the values of social movements. That contradiction can be particu-
larly acute for peace movements. Using Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) “hierarchy 
of influences” model, that contradiction can be demonstrated analytically, by con-
sidering influences on media content at every “level” – media workers, media rou-
tines, media’s corporate/organizational imperatives, extra-media institutions, and 
ideology/culture. For instance, within journalism, the routines of “objectivity” gen-
erate overdependence on official sources, the representation of conflict as two-
sided zero-sum contests, and an emphasis on events (like battles) rather than con-
text and processes (like peacebuilding) (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, 203-12). 
These characteristics were hardly favorable for the many anti-Amerika groups seek-
ing to promote better international relations and disarmament, in opposition to their 
own state’s policies. At the level of the governing logics and structural connections 
of media institutions, obstacles to peace discourse include the ownership of broad-
cast media by conglomerates (like General Electric) with “defence” industry hold-
ings; the increasing right-wing drift of media in the wake of the Reagan administra-
tion’s deregulation and abandonment of the “Fairness Doctrine” in broadcasting; 
the technological bias of television towards visual spectacles of war; and the com-
mercial imperative of attracting demographically profitable audiences whose atten-
tion can be sold to advertisers, via the easy route of ethnocentric, Manichean, dra-
matic narratives that reinforce rather than challenge conventional wisdom and es-
tablished prejudices (cf. Hackett 2007). Peace-promoting programming may be 
unattractive to major corporate advertisers not only on political grounds, but be-
cause it may be difficult to match with market-defined audience segments, or with 
the fast-paced consumption-oriented messages of television advertising. Crucially, 
social movements' struggle for a just world peace requires a reinvigorated public 
sphere -- for collective discussion and action against institutional inertia and en-
trenched vested interests. Arguably, though, the very structure as well as content of 
dominant media favor privatized consumption rather than widespread participation 
in civic discourse.  
Thus, there is an affinity between the project of media democratization, and the 
goals and the communication needs and activities of movements themselves. Ac-
cording to one scholar of popular communication, movements can be seen as "a 
communication pattern which emerges 'outside' and in opposition to the existing 
institutional, hierarchical (non-democratic) structure of communications."  Given 
their own need to strengthen membership loyalty, movements "tend to introduce 
and legitimate an alternative pattern of communication," even "a radically different 
normative theory of communication and a new culture of public communication," 
based on horizontal dialogue, and the reciprocal right to obtain and impart 
"communication inputs" and to participate in collective decision-making (White 
1995, 93).  
While such a view of social movements may be somewhat romanticized, it use-
fully suggests why they are a natural component of a coalition for media democrati-
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zation. Indeed, Hackett and Carroll (2006, 2-10) argue that since the 1980s, the 
terrain of political struggle for movements has been rendered increasingly difficult 
by a growing “democratic deficit” in the dominant media, one parallel to the he-
gemony of neoliberalism. They identify eight aspects of that deficit: the failure to 
constitute a democratic public sphere; the centralization of political, civic and sym-
bolic power inherent in the political economy of media industries; the homogeniza-
tion of publicly articulated discourses, notwithstanding the proliferation of chan-
nels; the failure to build community at local, national and global levels; the trans-
formation of the public commons of knowledge into a private enclosure of corpo-
rate-controlled commodities; the secretive and elitist process of communication 
policy-making; and the erosion of privacy and free expression rights.  
Since the 1980s, that democratic deficit has arguably become a shared griev-
ance for a variety of progressive movements. The Amerika campaign certainly did 
not take on that full agenda, but it marked a moment of transition. During the previ-
ous two decades, the 1960s and 1970s, there had been a modest surge of media 
activism. Alternative newspapers flourished, expressing the alienation of the mid-
dle-class youth “counterculture”. Within the formal political system, media reform 
advocacy emerged from and alongside other movements of the civil rights era: 
“Minorities, women, children’s advocates, seniors, organized labor, education ad-
vocates, and gays and lesbians, in coalition and separately, identified mass media 
policy as a site of struggle for equity and access” (Aufderheide 1999, 18-19). But 
such activism did not amount to a mass-based movement directly challenging the 
corporate media system itself, and its achievements were modest. The liberal media 
reformers “marginally extended the gains of civil rights and related social move-
ments” and institutionalized some of their cultural and social norms, but made little 
headway in transforming the economic and regulatory framework of media 
(Mueller et al. 2004, 47, 64). The waning of the Sixties’ movements and subse-
quent conservative hegemony left Washington-based reformers with little leverage 
within the system (Hackett and Carroll 2006, 94). For their part, more radical grass-
roots activists of the era were often naively confident in the emancipatory potential 
of “hand held media” (Halleck 2002), and in the openness of existing media to so-
cial change movements–civil rights, environmentalism, student protest. Only in 
retrospect did the destructive dynamics of movement dependence on mass media 
become evident (Gitlin 1980).  
The Amerika campaign then, was arguably part of a broader learning process, 
fostering a growing awareness of fundamental contradiction between movements 
and media. The campaign underscored the importance of movement energies in 
giving traction to media activism. At the same time – and this is my final point – 
the campaign was a practical springboard for a later wave of media democratiza-
tion. In particular, it gave concrete impetus to the emergence of an organization, 
FAIR, that focussed on media as a terrain of struggle in its own right, not specifi-
cally tied to any other movement. Starting as essentially a one-man plus volunteer 
operation, FAIR was able to parlay its pivotal role in the Amerika campaign, par-
ticularly in attracting mainstream media attention, into an ongoing and nationally 
recognized monitoring and advocacy organization. In that sense, Jeff Cohen de-
scribed Amerika as a “godsend” for a group “talking about conservative media bias 
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and Cold War media hysteria.” FAIR became arguably the leading progressive ad-
vocate for change in media content and structure at the national level, at least until 
the short-lived Cultural Environment Movement in the 1990s, and the more suc-
cessful Free Press media reform network in this decade. Through its critical analy-
ses of dominant news media, and its outreach and tactical advice to a growing net-
work of media activists, FAIR helped to nourish the wide range of democratic me-
dia activism (DMA) that has flourished since the 1990s. DMA now encompasses a 
variety of local, national and increasingly transnational groups in all its sectors – 
some oriented to the lifeworld of civil society, others to the dominant political and 
media system; some centred on the media field as such (the production and distri-
bution of texts, the provision of access to the means of public communication), 
others centred on the media’s “environment” (audience reception, state communi-
cation policies) (Hackett and Carroll 2006, 54-64).  
As a case study, Amerika addresses an important debate about that upsurge of 
DMA: Is it best understood as an adjunct of other movements, perhaps as a 
“movement nexus” (Hackett and Carroll 2006, 199)–or rather, as “a distinctive in-
dependent identity” (Napoli 2007, 51)?  Amerika provides support for both inter-
pretations. On the one hand, the campaign could not have occurred without the net-
works and volunteers of existing groups with other primary goals, notably the 
peace movement. FAIR’s Jeff Cohen functioned more as a catalyst and nexus, or-
ganizing meetings with representatives of major national peace groups, rather than 
as the leader of an existing media democracy movement. On the other hand, it is 
notable that the instigators of the campaign were more likely to be cultural workers 
than peace activists as such. In Toronto, most local peace groups ignored the film at 
first, or had little idea what to do about it; initiative and leadership came from pro-
fessionals in media occupations, people with concerns about media ethics and ef-
fects.  
Whether media democratization can constitute an identity equivalent in strength 
to that of other contemporary social movements remains an open question. The 
objective of this article has been to recall the pivotal role of a now-obscure cam-






Adams, William C., Dennis J. Smith, Allison Salzman, Ralph Crossen, Scott Hie-
ber, Tom Naccarato, William Vantine and Nine Weisbroth. 1986. Before and 
after The Day After: The unexpected results of televised drama. Political 
Communication and Persuasion 3 (3): 191-213. 
Aufderheide, Patricia (1999). Communications Policy and the Public Interest: The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. New York: Guilford Press. 
Bacchus, Lee. 1987. Amerika verdicts: Silly, boring and an upbeat view. Vancou-
ver Sun. February 16. 
Blair, Erica. 1987. The divided states of “Amerika.” TV Guide. February 14-20. 
Boyer, Paul. 1985. By the bomb's early light. New York: Pantheon. 
Democratic Communiqué 22, No. 2, Fall 2008 62 
17
Hackett: The Campaign Against ‘Amerika’: Catalyst for Media Democratizatio
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2021
Boyer, Peter J. 1987. Chrysler applies brakes to mini-series ads. Globe and Mail. 
January 28. 
Calixto, Judy. 1987. "Off-screen secrets of Amerika's beauties.” Star. February 24. 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 1987. Amerika: Behind the scenes.  Montreal: 
CBC Transcripts. 
Cohen, Jeff. 1987. "Amerika, a blessing in disguise?” Los Angeles Herald-
Examiner. February 18. 
Cooper, Marc. 1987. Newspeak. L.A. Weekly. February 20. 
Couldry, Nick. 2003. “Beyond the hall of mirrors? Some theoretical reflections on 
the global contestation of media power.” In Contesting Media Power: Alter-
native Media in a Networked World, eds. Nick Couldry and James Curran, 39-
54. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 
CRIS Campaign. 2005. Assessing Communication Rights: A Handbook. CRIS. 
www.crisinfo.org/CRAFT 
Galtung, Johann. 1987. United States foreign policy: As manifest theology. La Jolla, 
CA: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California at 
San Diego. 
Gamson, William A. and Gadi Wolfsfeld. 1993. Movements and media as interact-
ing systems. The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 528 (July): 114-125. 
Gitlin, Todd (1980). The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making and 
unmaking of the New Left. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of 
California Press. 
Gitlin, Todd. 1985. Inside prime time. New York: Pantheon. 
Gitlin, Todd. 1986. ABC's “Amerika”: The right wing paranoid's dream. Tikkun 1 
(December). 
Gottlieb, Jeff. 1987. Prime-time patriotism. Mother Jones, January. 
Gunther, Marc. 1986. Chrysler puts its Pride in “Amerika." The Detroit News, De-
cember 3. 
Hackett, Robert A. 2007.  Journalism versus peace? Notes on a problematic rela-
tionship. Global Media Journal, Mediterranean Edition 2(1) (Spring).  
Hackett, Robert A. and William K. Carroll. 2006. Remaking media: The struggle to 
democratize public communication. London: Routledge. 
Hackett, Robert A. and Yuezhi Zhao. 1998. Sustaining democracy? Journalism and 
the politics of objectivity. Toronto: Garamond. 
Halleck, DeeDee. 2002. Hand-held visions: The impossible possibilities of commu-
nity media. New York: Fordham University Press. 
Hallin, Daniel C. 1986a.  The ‘uncensored’ war: The media and Vietnam. Berkeley 
CA: University of California Press. 
Hallin, Daniel. 1986b. We keep America on top of the world. In Watching televi-
sion, ed. Todd Gitlin, 9-41. New York: Pantheon. 
Jarvis, Jeff. 1987. Tube: Amerika. People, February 16. 
Kim, Jin K., J. Justin Gustainis, and Pirouz Shoar-Ghaffari. 1988. "Amerika”: Se-
lectivity in exposure patterns and attitude influence. Paper presented to Inter-
national Communication Association, New Orleans. 
Knightley, Philip. 2002. Journalism, conflict and war: An introduction. Journalism 
63 Hackett / The Campaign Against ‘Amerika’ 
18
Democratic Communiqué, Vol. 22 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol22/iss2/3
Studies 3(2):167-71. 
Lynch, Jake and Annabel McGoldrick. 2005. Peace Journalism. Stroud, UK: Haw-
thorn Press. 
McChesney, Robert W. 2004. The problem of the media: U.S. communication poli-
tics in the twenty-first century. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Mieses, Stanley. 1987. The Russians are coming. American Film January/February: 
22-27. 
Montgomery, Kathryn C. 1989. Target: Prime time: Advocacy groups and the 
struggle over entertainment television. New York and Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1989. 
Mueller, M., B. Kuerbis and C. Page. 2004. Reinventing media activism: Public 
interest advocacy in the making of US communication-information policy, 
1960-2002. Syracuse, NY: The Convergence Center, School of Information 
Studies, Syracuse University (www.digitalconvergence.org), July 15. 
Napoli, Phillip. 2007. Public interest media activism and advocacy as a social 
movement: A review of the literature. Media, Arts and Culture Unit, Ford 
Foundation. (April: draft). 
Santarossa, Lauretta. 1986. Who will bless Amerika? Catholic New Times. August 
31 
Shoemaker, Pamela and Stephen Reese. 1996. Mediating the message: Theories of 
influences on mass media content, 2nd edition. White Plains, NY: Longman. 
Stein, Ben. 1983. Will Hollywood buy a movie about freedom? Los Angeles Herald
-Examiner. October 31. 
Taylor, Bill. 1986. Ferry calm through stormy Amerika. Toronto Star. August 23. 
Testa, Bart. 1987. Petits recits. The Idler, May/June: 23-28. 
Waters, Harry F. 1986. A storm over “Amerika." Newsweek, November 10. 
White, Robert A. 1995. Democratization of communication as a social movement 
process. In The Democratization of Communication, ed. Philip Lee, 92-113. 
Cardiff: University of Wales Press. 
Williams, Raymond. 1977. Marxism and Literature. New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 




This paper derives from one originally presented to the International Communica-
tion Association, New Orleans, 1988. It draws upon dozens of primary sources; the 
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